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NOTES
ADDRESSING THE CLOUD OVER EMPLOYEE
REFERENCES: A SURVEY OF RECENTLY ENACTED
STATE LEGISLATION
A recent survey by the Society for Human Resource Manage-
ment found that sixty-three percent of personnel managers re-
fused to provide reference information about former employees
to prospective employers.' Prompted by fear of lawsuits from
disgruntled employees, many employers have adopted a "name,
rank and serial number" approach to references, confirming only
employees' dates of employment and job titles.2 Several prob-
lems are inherent in this approach. Without complete references,
prospective employers are forced either to hire prospective em-
ployees without the information necessary to make informed
selections or reject employees and select other, potentially less
desirable candidates. In the process, good candidates may be
unable to secure jobs as a result of their past employers' refer-
ence policies.
This problem has not gone unnoticed by state legislatures.
The threat of increased legal action and the current inability of
employers to obtain references on prospective employees prompt-
ed employer groups and human resource professionals to call on
state legislatures to "lift the cloud that hangs over reference-
checking." In an effort to increase the free exchange of refer-
ences, at least twenty-six states now provide some type of statu-
tory immunity for employers when they provide a reference.4
1. See Frances A. McMorris, Some Firms Less Guarded in Sharing Job Referenc-
es, ARIZ. REPUBLIC/PHOENIX GAZETTE, July 15, 1996, at E4.
2. See D. Scott Landry & Randy Hoffman, Walking the Fine Line on Employee
Job Reference Information, 43 LA. BAR J. 457, 457 (1996).
3. Michael R. Losey, Reference-Checking Protocols Leave Everyone in the Dark,
MANAGING OFF. TECH., Nov. 1, 1995, at 34.
4. The states with employment reference statutes are Alaska, Arizona, California,
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Prior to 1995, only five states had such laws.5 This Note exam-
ines the nationwide trend towards employer immunity.
Numerous factors influence employers' decisions to provide
references. Traditionally, employers were concerned about defa-
mation suits.' The common law affords employers a conditional
privilege for the disclosure of information concerning employ-
ees;7 however, many employers view this protection as inade-
Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Michigan, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See ALAS-
KA STAT. § 09.65.160 (Michie 1996); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1361 (West Supp.
1996); CAL. CIrV. CODE § 47(c) (West Supp. 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-114 (Supp.
1996); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 708 (Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.095 (West
Supp. 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1-4 (Supp. 1996); IDAHO CODE § 44-201 (Supp.
1996); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 46/10 (West Supp. 1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-5-
3-1 (Michie 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-119a (Supp. 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
23:291 (West Supp. 1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 598 (West Supp. 1996);
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-399.7 (Supp. 1996); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 423.452 (West Supp. 1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-12-1 (Michie Supp. 1996); OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 4113.71 (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §
61 (West Supp. 1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.178 (Supp. 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-
6.4-1 (Supp. 1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-65 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1996); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAwS § 60-4-12 (Michie Supp. 1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-105 (Supp. 1996);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-42-1 (Supp. 1996); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.487 (West 1997);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-1-113 (Michie Supp. 1996); see also Julie Forster, 25 States
Adopt 'Good Faith' Job Reference Laws to Shield Businesses From Liability, WEST'S
LEGAL NEWS, July 2, 1996, available in 1996 WL 363324.
While this Note was being prepared for publication, a twenty-seventh state,
North Dakota, passed its own employer reference law. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-
02-18 (Supp. 1997). Due to its recent enactment, North Dakota's employer reference
statute is not discussed.
5. See Forster, supra note 4 (noting that only Alaska, California, Colorado, Flori-
da, and Georgia had employer-immunity laws prior to 1995).
6. See generally John Bruce Lewis et al., Defamation and the Workplace: A Sur-
vey of the Law and Proposals for Reform, 54 MO. L. REv. 797 (1989); Ramona L.
Paetzold & Steven L. Willborn, Employer (Ir)rationality and the Demise of Employ-
ment References, 30 AM. BUS. L.J. 123 (1992); 0. Lee Reed & Jan W. Henkel, Facili-
tating the Flow of Truthful Personnel Information: Some Needed Change in the Stan-
dard Required to Overcome the Qualified Privilege to Defame, 26 AM. BUS. L.J. 305
(1988); Ann M. Barry, Comment, Defamation in the Workplace: The Impact of In-
creasing Employer Liability, 72 MARQ. L. REV. 264 (1989); Deborah Daniloff, Note,
Employer Defamation: Reasons and Remedies for Declining References and Chilled
Communications in the Workplace, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 687 (1989).
7. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 15.07[2][a][ii] (1986 & Supp.
1996).
EMPLOYEE REFERENCE LAWS
quate' Negligent hiring suits, whereby employers can be held
liable for damages resulting from their failure to adequately
investigate employees' backgrounds,9 combined with increasing
concern over negligent referral or negligent misrepresentation
claims, have compounded employers' legal concerns in recent
years.'0 Under this latter cause of action, employers can be held
liable for not disclosing potentially dangerous characteristics of
former employees or for misrepresenting the actual reasons for
an employee's termination."
The legal relationship between employers and employees also
has changed in recent years. Statutory measures, such as Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964," have created additional
remedies for employees suffering defamatory references. Per-
haps the greatest single cause of the current reference gridlock
is employers' apparent misconception concerning the likelihood
of a lawsuit based on a reference. According to a group repre-
senting employers' interests, many companies have adopted a
"no comment" policy toward requests for references, despite the
fact that their fear of lawsuits outweighs the actual number of
such suits.'4 The recent statutory reforms are an attempt by
state legislatures to address some of these concerns.
The first section of this Note briefly examines the causes of
action that can stem from employee references. The second sec-
tion discusses the current environment employers face as they
weigh the potential costs and benefits of providing references.
The Note also addresses the policy concerns that are inherent in
any attempt to encourage the exchange of references. The next
8. See Forster, supra note 4.
9. See Carol Kleiman, Negligent Hiring Law Ensures a Safer Workplace, CHm.
TRiB., Aug. 18, 1996, at 1; McMorris, supra note 1.
10. See Forster, supra note 4.
11. See Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997)
(holding that a school district could be held liable for negligently misrepresenting
qualifications of a former employee who sexually assaulted a student); see also
McMorris, supra note 1 (noting that a Florida court held that an employer could be
held liable for failing to disclose the violent nature of a former employee).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 82-83.
14. See Forster, supra note 4 (citing Sharon Horrigan, state legislative affairs
manager for the Society for Human Resource Management).
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section surveys the various laws state legislatures have passed
recently in an effort to address these problems. It analyzes the
different approaches utilized by the states, how they alter com-
mon law doctrines, and, most importantly, how effective they are
likely to be in promoting the exchange of employee references.
This Note proposes a model statute that incorporates some of
the features of these new statutes as well as some of the pro-
posed reforms offered by academics. Specifically, the proposed
statute would require that in safety sensitive employment set-
tings, employers should be required by statute to disclose rele-
vant information about potentially dangerous employees. The
Note concludes that despite the state legislatures' efforts, the
majority of statutes will ultimately prove ineffective in encourag-
ing cautious employers to freely exchange referrals. Indeed, it
argues that legislative action alone is incapable of adequately
achieving the goal of facilitating the exchange of references.
Finally, this Note addresses the root cause of the current refer-
ence gridlock-employers' fears over lawsuits. In order for indi-
vidual employers to make a reasoned assessment about provid-
ing a reference, they need documented evidence about the poten-
tial risks they face. Associations representing employers should,
therefore, assess the true risks of defamation suits.
POTENTIAL CAUSES OF ACTION
Acts of hiring or providing references potentially can expose
employers to several forms of liability. Perhaps the most obvious
is a defamation claim. In a defamation claim, the harm of a
negative or untrue reference is borne by the employee through
damaged reputation or loss of a job opportunity.15 Claims of
negligent hiring and negligent misrepresentation are also be-
coming increasingly important. In contrast to defamation claims,
the damages resulting from these actions are borne by third
parties who were harmed as a result of hiring an individual. 6
15. See SMOLLA, supra note 7, at § 15.01.
16. See Ponticas v. KIM.S. Invs., 331 N.W.2d 907, 911 (Minn. 1983) (stating that
in negligent misrepresentation claims, negative or untrue references injure third par-
ties).
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To understand fully the aims of the newly enacted statutes, an
overview of each cause of action is required.
Defamation
At common law, the elements of a defamation claim are:
(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another;
(b) an unprivileged publication to a third party;
(c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the
publisher; and
(d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of spe-
cial harm or the existence of special harm caused by the
publication.17
A communication is defamatory if it tends to harm the reputa-
tion of another in a way that lowers that person in the estima-
tion of the community or deters others from associating with
that person.'"
Numerous authors have discussed at length the claim of defa-
mation as it relates to employee references. 9 A particularly
vexing concern for employers is that any statement, even one
expressed as an opinion, can amount to actionable defamation if
it reasonably implies a false assertion of fact.2' Statements that
negatively represent an employee's abilities, criminal history,
honesty, or integrity can be bases for a defamation claim.2'
17. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF ToRTS § 558 (1977).
18. See id. § 559.
19. See supra note 6.
20. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18-21 (1990); W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 113, at 814 (5th ed.
1984); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977) (stating that a de-
famatory communication in the form of an opinion can be actionable if it implies the
allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for an opinion). An opinion
can be regarded as false if either the speaker did not entertain the opinion ex-
pressed or if a reasonable person would not have that opinion based on the facts.
See KEETON ET AL. § 113a, at 816.
21. See RONALD M. GREEN & RIcHARD J. REIBSTEIN, EMPLOYER's GUIDE TO
WORKPLACE TORTS 63 (1992).
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Truth is an absolute defense to a defamation claim.22 Anoth-
er defense to a defamation claim is privilege.' A publication
may be privileged if "there is information that affects a suffi-
ciently important interest of the recipient or a third person" and
"the recipient is one to whom the publisher is under a legal duty
to publish the defamatory matter or is a person to whom its
publication is otherwise within the generally accepted standards
of decent conduct."' An absolute privilege exists for statements
made in judicial proceedings, legislative proceedings, and execu-
tive communications.25 In instances in which public policy fa-
vors the free exchange of information over an individual's inter-
est in his or her privacy, a qualified privilege exists.26 As a gen-
eral rule, statements made in the employer reference context are
considered conditionally privileged due to the important interest
at stake.
Once the defendant establishes the existence of a privilege, the
plaintiff bears the burden of proving its abuse. 8 Under common
law, the privilege can be abused by knowledge of falsity or reck-
less disregard as to the falsity of the defamatory matter, publi-
cation for an improper purpose, publication to persons other than
those to whom the communication is important, or publication
not reasonably believed to be necessary to accomplish the pur-
pose for which the occasion is privileged.29 Although the term
"malice" is not listed in the Restatement, it is often cited as a
condition required to defeat common law qualified privilege."0
22. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A.
23. See Turner v. Halliburton Co., 722 P.2d 1106, 1112 (Kan. 1986).
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 595(1).
25. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, § 114, at 815-23. An absolute privilege also
applies when the plaintiff consents to the defamatory publication in the marital
relationship and in political broadcasts. See id. at 823-24.
26. See Halliburton, 722 P.2d at 1112.
27. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 595, cmt. i; see also Reed & Henkel,
supra note 6, at 312 (stating that in a typical employer defamation case, the requi-
sites for qualified privilege exist).
28. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, § 115, at 835.
29. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 600-605A (1977).
30. See Reed & Henkel, supra note 6, at 312.
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Negligent Hiring
The tort of negligent hiring is now recognized in almost every
state.3' Under this theory, "an employer has the duty to exer-
cise reasonable care in view of all the circumstances in hiring
individuals who, because of the employment, may pose a threat
of injury to members of the public." 2 Because an employer can
be held liable for acts of its employees which occur outside the
scope of the employees' duties, negligent hiring is an exception
to the doctrine of respondeat superior.3
To succeed on a claim of negligent hiring, a plaintiff must
prove:
1. "[The employee who caused the injury was unfit for hiring
or retention, or was fit only if properly supervised."'
2. "[Tlhe employer's hiring or retention of the unfit employee,
or the failure to properly supervise the employee, was the
proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries.""
3. "[Tlhe employer knew or should have known of the
employee's lack of fitness.""6
The "prototype example of a negligent hiring claim"37 is
Ponticas v. KM.S. Investments.". In Ponticas, prior to hiring
the employee as resident manager of an apartment complex, the
employer failed to make any inquiry into the employee's back-
ground other than performing a credit check and having him
complete a standard application form. 9 The employer was
therefore, unaware of the employee's convictions for burglary,
31. See GREEN & REiBSTEIN, supra note 21, at 5.
32. Ponticas v. IM.S. Invs., 331 N.W.2d 907, 911 (Minn. 1983).
33. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958) (stating the elements of a
traditional respondeat superior claim).
34. GREEN & REIBSTEIN, supra note 21, at 5.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Paul S. Swedlund, Negligent Hiring and Apportionment of Fault Between Neg-
ligent and Intentional Tortfeasors: A Consideration of Two Unanswered Questions in
South Dakota Tort Law, 41 S.D. L. REV. 45, 61 (1996).
38. 331 N.W.2d 907 (Minn. 1983).
39. See id. at 909-10.
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receiving stolen property, and armed robbery.4" As resident
manager, the employee had access to all of the apartments in
the complex through use of a passkey.4' Soon after being hired,
the employee entered a tenant's apartment through use of the
passkey and sexually assaulted the tenant at knifepoint.42
The court in Ponticas concluded that the scope of the
employer's duty to investigate a prospective employee is "directly
related to the severity of risk third parties are subjected to by
an incompetent employee."43 An employer's responsibility to
investigate might be limited in situations where the risk of inju-
ry to others is slight; however, in situations where there is a
risk of substantial harm to third parties, "the employer has the
duty to use reasonable care to investigate his competency and
reliability prior to employment."'
The rise of negligent hiring claims illustrates the important
role that references play in the hiring process. Because employ-
ers are responsible in certain situations for investigating the
background of prospective employees, the need to obtain com-
plete information on those individuals takes on greater urgency.
Former employers may have legal concerns over providing refer-
ences, but potential employers may have equally pressing legal
needs to obtain such references.
Negligent Referral
In a 1991 law review Note, Janet Swerdlow spoke of negligent
referral as a potential theory of recovery for plaintiffs.45
Swerdlow argued that a legal basis exists for imposing upon
employers an affirmative duty to provide employee references.46
No such duty currently exists.47 Two recent cases, however,
40. See id. at 909.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. Id. at 913.
44. Id.
45. See Janet Swerdlow, Comment, Negligent Referral: A Potential Theory for Em-
ployer Liability, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1645, 1667-71 (1991).
46. See id. at 1660-71.
47. See generally Moore v. St. Joseph Nursing Home, 459 N.W.2d 100, 102 (Mich.
184 [Vol. 39:177
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suggest that when employers choose to provide references, they
can be held liable for the harms that result if the references mis-
represent or omit relevant facts about employees' dangerous
propensities.
Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified School District," involved a
series of recommendation letters written by former employers of
a school vice principal accused of sexually assaulting a thirteen-
year-old female student." The student's complaint alleged that
the former employers provided detailed recommendation letters
to the prospective school employer despite knowledge of prior
sexual misconduct with female students.0 The letters described
the vice principal in glowing terms and unconditionally recom-
mended him for an administrative position, despite his forced
resignation under pressure due to his past behavior with female
students.5' Although the letters did not affirmatively state that
the vice principal was never accused of sexual misconduct, the
California Supreme Court ruled the omission of such accusa-
tions, coupled with the unqualified recommendations, rendered
the letters affirmative misrepresentations."
More importantly, the court held that the former employers
owed a duty to the student to refrain from misrepresenting the
qualifications of their former employee.53 In so doing, the court
relied on sections 310 and 311 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.' Section 310 states:
An actor who makes a misrepresentation is subject to liabil-
ity to another for physical harm which results from an act
done by the other or a third person in reliance upon the truth
of the representation, if the actor
(a) intends his statement to induce or should real-
ize that it is likely to induce action by the other, or
Ct. App. 1990) (referring to the duty to disclose information about a past employee
as merely "an imperfect obligation of a moral or social character").
48. 929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997).
49. See id. at 584-85.
50. See id. at 585.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 592-93.
53. See id. at 591.
54. See id.
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a third person, which involves an unreasonable
risk of physical harm to the other, and
(b) knows
(i) that the statement is false, or
(ii) that he has not the knowledge which he
professes.55
Section 311 states in part:
(1) One who negligently gives false information to an-
other is subject to liability for physical harm caused by
action taken by the other in reasonable reliance upon
such information, where such harm results
(a) to the other, or
(b) to such third persons as the actor should expect
to be put in peril by the action taken.5
The defendants argued that holding employers liable in these
types of situations would inhibit employers from providing refer-
ence information.57 Once employers decided to provide referenc-
es, the defendants argued, they would be forced to include all
negative information, including unproven rumors about em-
ployees, thus exposing themselves to potential defamation
suits." Rather than taking this risk, employers would simply
adopt "no comment" policies or confirm only employees' posi-
tions, salaries, and dates of employment." The plaintiff re-
sponded that an employer's qualified privilege would be suffi-
cient to protect employers from such suits and to encourage the
exchange of references in the typical situation.' Despite the
defendants' policy concerns, the California Supreme Court
agreed with the court of appeals' conclusion that there was "no
compelling reason to reject section 311 subdivision (1)(b)." ' The
court attempted to limit its holding, however, by restricting the
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 310 (1977).
56. Id. § 311.
57. See Randi W., 929 P.2d at 589-90.
58. See id. at 590.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 590-91.
61. Randi W. v. Livingston Union Sch. Dist., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 471, 483 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1995).
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duty not to misrepresent to situations in which the making of
representations "would present a substantial, foreseeable risk of
physical injury to the prospective employer or third persons.""
In the absence of resulting physical injury or some special rela-
tionship between the parties, however, the court ruled that no
such duty exists with regard to third persons, and that the poli-
cy of favoring the free exchange of references should prevail.'
Another alarming decision for employers involved similar
facts. In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Jerner," a Florida court of
appeals upheld a lower court ruling that found a former employ-
er liable for concealing the violent nature of Paul Calden, a
former employee.' After being fired by his new employer,
Calden returned to the employer's office building and shot five
people.66 The widows of three men killed in the attack sued
Calden's former employer, Allstate Insurance Company, for pro-
viding a misleading reference that contributed to their husbands'
deaths. 7 Despite its policy of not giving recommendation let-
ters, Allstate had provided a reference to Calden's new employ-
er, Fireman's Fund Insurance Company, stating that Calden had
resigned voluntarily due to corporate restructuring." In reality,
Allstate had induced Calden's resignation because he came to
work with a gun, threatened other employees, and generally act-
ed in a bizarre fashion.69
Both Jerner and Randi W. created potential concern for em-
ployers considering whether to provide a reference. Neither case
establishes an affirmative duty to respond to a request for a
reference, but the cases do stand for the proposition that if for-
62. Randi W., 929 P.2d at 591.
63. See id.
64. 650 So.2d 997 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (denying certiorari).
65. See McMorris, supra note 1, at E4.
66. See Martie Ross, Employee References: No Longer Damned If You Do, but
Possibly Damned If You Don't, KAN. EMPLOyiENT L. LETTER, Feb. 1996, at 1-2,
available in LEXIS, Employ Library, Emplaw File.
67. See Kleiman, supra note 9.
68. See Ross, supra note 66, at 2.
69. Some of Calden's more bizarre behavior involved his claim that he was from
another planet and that his image could not be captured in a photograph. See id.
Calden's employer was so concerned about his behavior that he contacted the FBI
and the local sheriffs office and inquired whether they were investigating Calden.
See id.
19971
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
mer employers provide references, they may be held liable to
third parties for misrepresenting or intentionally omitting rele-
vant information.7' By disclosing negative information, employ-
ers potentially expose themselves to defamation claims.7' By
intentionally failing to include negative information, employers
face possible negligent referral claims.72 These rulings have
helped to create a "damned if you do, damned if you don't" fear
among employers that discourages the exchange of references.73
Although these two cases appear isolated, the wide publicity
they received helped to trigger a campaign to create some form
of statutory immunity for employers and placed the issue of
references before state legislatures.74
OTHER FACTORS EXPLAINING EMPLOYER UNWILLINGNESS TO
PROVIDE REFERENCES
In addition to potential defamation, negligent hiring, and
negligent referral suits, employers today must contend with an
increasing number of statutory and judicial restrictions on their
actions. The decline of the "at will presumption" is one such
restrictive force. 5 Ironically, growing concern over the issue of
violence in the workplace has both increased prospective
employers' need for references and decreased the willingness of
employers to provide references." Finally, the burden of de-
fending suits based on references creates an additional
disincentive for employers to provide references.77
70. See Randi W. v. Muroc Union Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582, 591 (Cal. 1997).
71. See Kleiman, supra note 9.
72. See id.
73. See id.; see also, Maura Dolan & Stuart Silverstein, Court Broadens Liability
for Job References, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1997, at Al (quoting a lawyer as saying
that Randi W. "tells employers, Do not give references').
74. See McMorris, supra note 1.
75. See infra text accompanying notes 80-81.
76. See infra text accompanying notes 91-99.
77. See infra text accompanying notes 100-04.
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The Decline of the At Will Presumption
At common law, the at will presumption governs the employ-
ment relationship."v This doctrine assumes that both employers
and employees are free to terminate their relationship at any
time for any reason.7 In recent years, judicial and legislative
actions have weakened this presumption.0 While this trend
arguably has benefited employees, it has caused employers to be
particularly cautious when they terminate employees.8 '
In addition to limiting employers' rights to fire for discrimina-
tory reasons, the Supreme Court recently has interpreted section
704(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 to create a
private right of action for former employees who have received
discriminatory, negative referrals from past employers.s Many
states have antiblacklisting statutes that prohibit employers
from seeking to prevent former employees from obtaining other
employment." The Americans With Disabilities Act's (ADA's)85
recognition of mental illness as a disability86 creates a potential
Catch-22 for employers.87 While employers could be held liable
78. See 1 MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 12-15 (1994).
79. See id. at 13.
80. Many courts recognize the tort claim of wrongful discharge in violation of
public policy, whereby an employer's motive for discharging an employee harms an
important interest of the community. See, e.g., Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512, 515
(Or. 1975). Other courts have recognized an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in the employment setting, whereby neither party may do anything that has
the effect of injuring the right of another to receive the fruits of the contract. See
generally Monique C. Lillard, Fifty Jurisdictions in Search of a Standard: The Cove-
nant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in the Employment Context, 57 Mo. L. REv.
1233 (1992) (comparing different conceptions of the covenant among the states).
81. See Lillard, supra note 80, at 1242.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994).
83. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 117 S. Ct. 843 (1997) (holding that the term
"employees" as used in Title VII § 704(a) includes former employees).
84. For a discussion of these statutes, see Bradley Saxton, Flaws in the Laws
Governing Employment References: Problems of "Overdeterrence" and a Proposal for
Reform, 13 YALE L. & POLY REV. 45, 54-57 (1995).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 12,101-12,213 (1994).
86. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2).
87. See Edward Felsenthal, Potentially Violent Employees Present Bosses with A
Catch-22, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 1995, at B1 (discussing a lawsuit brought against an
employer for firing an employee whose mental instability qualified as a disability
under the ADA).
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under a negligent retention theory for retaining dangerous work-
ers, they could also be subject to liability under the ADA for fir-
ing mentally unstable and potentially dangerous workers."
The decline of the at will presumption has, therefore, provided
employees with more potential causes of action in the event of
dismissal. As a result, employees may sue under more than one
theory if they believe they were terminated wrongfully.89 Ac-
cording to one estimate, employment litigation and civil rights
complaints associated with employment have increased by
2,166% over the last twenty years.9"
Workplace Violence
Another concern affecting employers in their decisions regard-
ing references is the highly publicized issue of workplace vio-
lence.9 Employers cannot help but be alarmed when they read
the horror stories that are reported routinely in the news. One
of the more infamous examples is that of Gian Luigi Ferri, the
gunman who opened fire in the offices of the San Francisco law
firm Pettit & Martin in 1993, killing eight people.92
According to the U.S. Labor Department, homicides were the
second leading cause of workplace death in 1995."3 On average,
twenty workers are slain and 18,000 assaulted at work each
week according to the National Institute for Occupational Safety
and Health (NIOSH). 4 According to one survey, nearly half of
88. See id.
89. See Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 6, at 139 (noting that from 1965 to 1969,
only six of twenty-five employment-related defamation suits involved wrongful dis-
charge or constitutional claims, whereas from 1985 to 1986, 64 of 118 suits included
such claims).
90. See Catch 22: Informed Employees Sue More, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, June 1995,
at 34.
91. See Kleiman, supra note 9 (discussing a management consulting firm address-
ing problems of negligent hiring and workplace violence).
92. See Shooting Fields Are Everywhere, San Francisco Horror Reveals Problem
Anew, LA TIMES, July 3, 1993, at B7; Jenifer Warren & Patt Morrison, Roving
Gunman Kills 8, Self in S.F. High-Rise, LA TIMES, July 2, 1993, at Al.
93. See Rochelle Sharpe, Work Week, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 1996, at Al.
94. See NIOSH Study Shows 20 Workers Slain Each Week; Florida Cities Imple-
ment Violence Prevention Programs, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, Aug. 8, 1996, available in
1996 WL 443253 [hereinafter NIOSH Study].
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1,000 human resource managers surveyed reported that one or
more violent incidents had occurred at work since January 1,
1994.g5
Some basis exists, however, to conclude that the problem of
workplace violence has been dramatically overstated. According
to one federal study, only fifty-nine employees out of a national
workforce of 120.8 million, or approximately one in two million,
were killed by co-workers or former co-workers during 1993.96
The odds of getting struck by lightning are higher.97 Not sur-
prisingly, the NIOSH study indicates that the greatest threat of
workplace homicide stems, not from other employees, but from
violence incident to robberies, especially for retail workers and
taxi cab drivers. 8
Regardless of the reality, the perception that workplace vio-
lence is on the rise clearly exists." This perception helps ex-
plain the importance of complete and accurate references to
employers. Alarmed by workplace violence statistics, employers
understandably may refuse to hire employees who lack refer-
ences for fear of exposing their companies to potential negligent
hiring charges.
Cost As a Deterrent
The evidence indicates that employers win the majority of
defamation suits brought against them.'0 0 Logically, employers
should have little to fear about facing such suits. The cost of
defending such suits, however, is by itself a deterrent to employ-
95. See LAndsey Novak, Danger Zone; Workplace Violence Is on the Rise, Cm.
TRIB., Aug. 25, 1996, at 1 (citing a survey by the Society for Human Resource Man-
agement).
96. See Erik Larson, Trigger Happy: A False Crisis: How Workplace Violence Be-
came a Hot Issue, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 1994, at Al.
97. See id. (citing National Weather Service statistics of one in 600,000 odds of
being struck by lightning).
98. See NIOSH Study, supra note 94.
99. See, e.g., id. (referring to disgruntled workers as a stereotypical source of
workplace violence).
100. See Reed & Henkel, supra note 6, at 318; see also Paetzold & Willborn, supra
note 6, at 136-37 (relating results of a survey showing that plaintiffs won only 25%
of cases involving employment references from 1985 to 1989).
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ers who are considering whether to provide references.''
Abuse of the conditional privilege to defame is generally a ques-
tion of fact for a jury.' 2 Unless employers are able to obtain
summary judgments, they most likely will spend substantial
time and money defending against defamation claims. This ex-
pense is particularly burdensome on smaller companies. 3 A
number of employers may simply elect not to provide references
and thereby avoid the burden of having to face defamation
claims.'
Employer Groups Strike Back
Given the factors discussed above, many employers choose not
to supply references. In response to these concerns, employer
groups have mobilized in recent years to lobby state legislatures
in an attempt to provide reluctant employers some type of statu-
tory immunity when they provide a reference. 5 Groups such
as the Society for Human Resource Management and the Na-
tional Federation of Independent Businesses (NFIB) began a
national campaign to convince state legislatures that the com-
mon law protections afforded employers were insufficient to
allow employers to exchange references freely.' According to
the NFIB, ninety percent of its members indicated on an associ-
ation survey that they needed legislative protection when giving
references.0 7
Organized labor and trial lawyers' associations in many states
opposed the campaign.' Opponents argued that the proposed
legislation would prevent employees from having legal recourse
101. See Reed & Henkel, supra note 6, at 318.
102. See id.
103. See Forster, supra note 4, at 2 (quoting a Society for Human Resource Man-
agement representative as saying that attorney fees in defamation cases "can literal-
ly shut down a small employer").
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id
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in the event of defamatory references." 9 Furthermore, oppo-
nents complained that the entire employer reference problem
had been exaggerated and that the statutory reforms were un-
necessary."'
Apparently, legislators were sympathetic to the concerns of
employers, because the number of employer immunity statutes
increased dramatically."' The trend toward legislation is likely
to continue. At least sixteen state legislatures have considered,
but failed to pass, employer reference legislation."' According
to Sherman Joyce, president of the American Tort Reform Asso-
ciation: "If there's any one issue that's really popped up on the
[state legislature] screen, it's the employer reference issue." "
COMPETING POLICY INTERESTS
Before the merits and faults of the various pieces of legisla-
tion are considered, a framework for analysis is needed. Al-
though employers understandably are concerned about the situa-
tion at present, the laws will also affect the interests of employ-
ees. The interests of the two sides sometimes overlap," but
109. See id.
110. See Patrick Graham, Bill Would Grant Immunity for Employer References,
MEMPHIS BUS. J., Feb. 26, 1996, at 15, available in 1996 WL 8428940.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 4-5.
112. To date, those states that have considered, but failed to pass, such legislation
include Arkansas, Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississippi, Mis-
souri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Vermont,
Virginia, and Washington. See H.B. 5797, 1997 Reg. Sess. (Conn. 1997), available in
LEXIS, Conn. Library, Cttrck File; H.B. 1206, 1997 Reg. Sess. (Miss. 1997), available
in LEXIS, Legis Library, Sttrck File; H.B. 538, Sess. of 1997 (N.C. 1997), available
in LEXIS, Legis Library, Sttrck File; H.B. 166, 64th Biennial Sess. (Vt. 1997), avail-
able in LEXIS, VT Library, Vttrck File; Peter Callaghan et al., Legislature 1997:
Seahawk Stadium Bill Almost Snuffed; Legislation Survives Its First Deadline But
Without Any Plan For How It Will Be Funded, NEWS TREB., Mar. 6, 1997, at B1,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (discussing Washington's proposed
employer reference stature); Forester, supra note 4 (listing Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Virginia); Amy Zuber,
States Mull Reference Protections for Employers, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Apr.
21, 1997, at 3, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (listing, inter alia,
Arkansas and New Hampshire).
113. Mark A. Hofinann, State Wrap-Up 1996: Drive to Change Tort Laws Slows,
Bus. INS., June 17, 1996, at 1.
114. See Forster, supra note 4 (noting that legislation that promotes the circulation
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often they are at odds."' Presumably, state legislators weighed
several competing policy factors when voting on these statutes.
Societal Interest in the Free Exchange of References
The analysis of the statutes must begin with the assumption
that it is in society's best interest if employers exchange refer-
ences. By having as much relevant information as possible, em-
ployers are better able to make informed selections when filling
vacant positions." 6 This access to information, in turn, helps to
ensure a safer and more efficient workplace. In many cases,
employer reference exchange is also in the best interest of em-
ployees."' Given the current situation, some good employees
are harmed by employers' unwillingness to provide references,
while bad employees potentially are shielded from receiving the
negative references they deserve."8
The Societal Interest in Reducing Employer Liability
Society also is served by limiting employers' liability for pro-
viding references and by limiting the legal requirements employ-
ers must meet in order to exchange references. If employers are
forced to clear numerous legal hurdles before they are afforded
immunity for providing references, then they will be less likely
to exchange references." 9 Limiting the requirements on em-
ployers before they attain immunity will enable employers to
make more efficient use of time and resources in their day to
day operations.20 Furthermore, it would reduce the potential
of references helps employers get good information and prospective employees get
jobs).
115. See McMorris, supra note 1 (noting concerns of employees regarding unfavor-
able references).
116. See generally Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 6, at 124-25 (discussing the
benefits of reference information).
117. See supra note 114.
118. See Forster, supra note 4 (quoting an NFIB spokesman as saying that the
current situation hinders good employees and benefits bad employees).
119. See Reed & Henkel, supra note 6, at 315-18 (describing the negative impact of
the litigation hurdles employers must overcome under current qualified privilege
standards).
120. See Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 6, at 126-27 (noting the effect of defama-
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for litigation premised solely upon the alleged failure to comply
with a technical prerequisite creating immunity. Similarly, lim-
iting employers' exposure to lawsuits would help reduce
employers' expenditures on such suits and would encourage a
more efficient use of resources.
The Societal Interest in Employee Privacy Rights
Counterbalancing the above interests is the desire of society to
protect employees' privacy rights. Reasonable public policy dic-
tates that employers should not be able to disclose irrelevant or
false information or to maliciously seek to hinder employees'
employment prospects."2 Although it would be a simple matter
to grant employers blanket immunity even when they provide
false references,122 such a policy would obviously hinder the in-
terests of those employees who have legitimate grievances. Simi-
larly, society does not wish to see minor negative incidents per-
manently affect employees' employment prospects. As one attor-
ney framed the issue, "[Should] somebody [be] unemployed for
the rest of their life for getting into a fist fight?""
SURVEY OF THE STATUTES
Recent employer reference statutes share many common char-
acteristics, but classifying any one statute as the "typical" em-
ployer reference law is difficult. This section is divided into two
areas of analysis. The first area examines some of the character-
istics the statutes share, such as the creation of a good faith
presumption and conditional privilege on the part of employ-
ers,' the proscription of disclosures in violation of civil rights
on non-disclosure agreements,' the types of information that
tion liability on the costs of reference information); Reed & Henkel, supra note 6, at
318 (noting the cost and inefficiency of resolution through litigation).
121. See SMOLLA, supra note 7, § 15.07[21[a][ii].
122. See generally Reed & Henkel, supra note 6, at 311-12 (describing circum-
stances under which absolute privilege to defame is appropriate).
123. See McMorris, supra note 1 (quoting Garry Mathiason, a partner in the firm
of Littler, Mendleson, Fastiff, Tichy & Mathiason).
124. See infra notes 133-64 and accompanying text.
125. See infra notes 165-67 and accompanying text.
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may be disclosed in references, 2 ' and the issue of whether em-
ployers must wait for requests from prospective employers be-
fore providing references. 2 ' The second portion looks at some
of the unusual provisions of the statutes, including the grant of
an absolute privilege, attorney fee shifting provisions, 2 9
protection from negligent hiring claims,"10 and the requirement
that employees approve any release of information prior to its
actual release.' 3 1 Within each category, the changes, if any, the
statutes have made to the common law are analyzed. Finally,
each category analyzes the effectiveness of the provisions in
balancing competing policy interests.32
The Good Faith Presumption and Its Abuses
The most common feature of the new employer reference stat-
utes is the creation of a rebuttable good faith presumption when
employers publish references. Twenty-four of the twenty-six
statutes either explicitly state or imply that employers who
provide references according to all other statutory requirements
are presumed to be acting in good faith.' 3 Statutes that im-
126. See infra notes 168-82 and accompanying text.
127. See infra notes 183-91 and accompanying text.
128. See infra notes 192-96 and accompanying text.
129. See infra notes 197-205 and accompanying text.
130. See infra notes 206-08 and accompanying text.
131. See infra notes 209-10 and accompanying text.
132. For an interesting discussion of the various policy considerations that would be
embodied in a model employer reference law, see Saxton, supra note 84, at 78-79.
Professor Saxton's article greatly influenced some of the ideas contained in this
Note.
133. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.160 (Michie 1996); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1361
(West Supp. 1996); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-114 (Supp. 1996); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
19, § 708 (Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.095 (West Supp. 1997); GA. CODE
ANN. § 34-1-4 (Supp. 1996); IDAHO CODE § 44-201 (Supp. 1996); 745 ILL. COw.
STAT. ANN. 46/10 (West Supp. 1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-5-3-1 (Michie 1997); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:291 (West Supp. 1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 598
(West Supp. 1996); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-399.7 (Supp. 1996);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.452 (West Supp. 1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-12-1
(Michie Supp. 1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.71 (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1997);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 61 (West Supp. 1997); O. REV. STAT. § 30.178 (Supp.
1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.4-1 (Supp. 1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-65 (Law Co-
op. Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAwS § 60-4-12 (Michie Supp. 1996); TENN. CODE
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pliedly create a good faith presumption often do so by stating
that employers are immune from liability unless employees are
able to show that the immunity was abused."8 To rebut the
presumption, employees must demonstrate through either a
preponderance of the evidence or through clear and convincing
evidence that employers abused the privilege.'35 Thirteen
states chose the preponderance standard while seven utilize the
more demanding clear and convincing standard."6 Four states
make no mention of what standard is to be applied, presumably
relying on the common law of that state. 13
7
The presumption of good faith created by the statutes paral-
lels the conditional privilege afforded employers at common
law."'38 It simply removes the slight burden on employers of es-
tablishing a privilege. As at common law, plaintiffs must demon-
strate that employers have abused the privilege.3 9
ANN. § 50-1-105 (Supp. 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-42-1 (Supp. 1996); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 895.487 (West 1997); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-1-113 (Michie Supp. 1996).
134. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 22-5-3-1 (Michie 1997).
135. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-114(2)(a) (Supp. 1996) (establishing a prepon-
derance of the evidence standard); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 598 (West Supp.
1996) (establishing a clear and convincing evidence standard).
136. Those states adopting a preponderance of the evidence standard include Alas-
ka, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, Ohio, Oklahoma, Ore-
gon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Wyoming. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.160 (Michie
1996); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-114(2)(a) (Supp. 1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1-4(b)
(Supp. 1996); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 46/10 (West Supp. 1997); IND. CODE ANN. §
22-5-3-1(b) (Michie 1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:291(A) (West Supp. 1997); MICH.
COMEP. LAWS ANN. § 423.452 (West Supp. 1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.71(B)
(Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 61(A) (West Supp. 1997);
OR. REV. STAT. § 30.178 (Supp. 1996); L.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.4-1(c) (Supp. 1996);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-105 (Supp. 1996); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-1-113(a) (Michie
Supp. 1996). Those states adopting the clear and convincing standard include Flori-
da, Idaho, Maine, Maryland, South Dakota, Utah, and Wisconsin. See FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 768.095 (West Supp. 1997); IDAHO CODE § 44-201(2) (Supp. 1996); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 598 (West Supp. 1996); MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JUD. PROC. §
5-399.7(b) (Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-4-12 (Michie Supp. 1996); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 34-42-1(3) (Supp. 1996); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.487(2) (West 1997).
137. Those states remaining silent include Arizona, Delaware, New Mexico, and
South Carolina. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1361 (West Supp. 1996); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 19, § 708; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-12-1 (Michie Supp. 1996); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 41-1-65 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1996).
138. Compare, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-114(1) (Supp. 1996) with supra text
accompanying note 27.
139. Compare, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 8-2-114(2)(a) (Supp. 1996) with supra text
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There is great disparity between the statutes regarding how
employers lose the conditional privilege. Traditionally, public
figures and private figures were distinguished by the degree of
fault required to demonstrate that publishers have acted in a
defamatory manner.4 ° Public official and public figure
plaintiffs must establish the existence of actual malice.' In
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan," the Supreme Court defined
a statement made with actual malice as being one made "with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of wheth-
er it was false or not."' This language essentially parallels
the Restatement's abuse of privilege standard."' Although not
explicitly listed in the Restatement, in private figure cases, "[i]t
is frequently held that a conditional privilege is forfeited if the
publication is made with 'malice' in the traditional common law
sense of actual spite or ill will."'45 The plaintiffs burden of
proof also varies depending on whether actual malice or common
law malice is required. Traditionally, common law malice need
only be demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence,
whereas actual malice must be demonstrated with convincing
clarity.146
The reason for the distinction between the burdens of proof
stems from the focus on the important issue at stake in the
publication. If, as in the case of public officials, a speaker could
be held liable for speech motivated by ill will, then the speaker
would be discouraged from voicing opinions on matters of public
concern. 47 The same type of fear may motivate employers in
the reference context. While information about employees is
accompanying notes 28-29.
140. See SMOLLA, supra note 7, § 3.01[l].
141. See id. § 3.0112].
142. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
143. Id. at 280; see also SMOLLA, supra note 7, § 3.01121.
144. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
145. SMOLLA, supra note 7, § 8.09[31[a]; see also Reed & Henkel, supra note 6, at
313 n.43.
146. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 285-86; SMOLLA, supra note 7, § 3.07.
147. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279 (stating that such cases require actual
malice because, to do otherwise, would be to "dampen[] the vigor and limit[] the va-
riety of public debate").
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rarely a matter of public concern, in the case of potentially dan-
gerous employees, the interest at stake-public safety-may be
just as important. The important interest at stake in employ-
ment references therefore, seems sufficiently analogous to mat-
ters of public concern that the requirement of "actual malice" in
such cases seems appropriate.
In recent years, a growing number of jurisdictions have placed
conditional common law privileges on par with the more rigid
public figure malice standard, "holding that such privileges are
lost only if the defendant acted with knowledge of falsity or
recklessness .... ."4 The recent statutory enactments seem to
reflect this trend. Some of the states do not state explicitly the
actual malice requirement, but at least six of the statutes clearly
employ this standard. 4 Idaho, for example, explicitly states
only a showing that "the employer disclosed the information
with actual malice or deliberate intent to mislead"50 will rebut
the presumption of good faith. Although not using the term
"actual malice," Michigan requires the employer to have know-
ingly disclosed false information or to have disclosed information
"with a reckless disregard for the truth."5'
A handful of statutes use a standard that is somewhat more
difficult to categorize neatly.5 Maine's statute, for example,
requires the good faith presumption to be rebutted through "the
knowing disclosure, with malicious intent, of false or deliberate-
ly misleading information."15 Although the "knowing disclo-
148. SMOLLA, supra note 7, § 8.09[5].
149. Arizona, Idaho, Maryland, Michigan, South Carolina, and Utah use this ap-
proach. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1361(D) (West Supp. 1996); IDAHO CODE §
44-201(2) (Supp. 1996); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-399.7(b)(1) (Supp.
1996); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.452(a),(b) (West Supp. 1997); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 41-1-65(D) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-42-1(3) (Supp. 1996).
150. § 44-201(2).
151. § 423.452(2)(a),(b). Michigan's statute is unusual in that, although it employs
an actual malice standard, it requires the plaintiff to prove malice only by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. See id. § 423-452. A possible explanation for this approach
is that the statute also requires the presumption of good faith to be rebutted by
demonstrating that "the disclosure was specifically prohibited by a state or federal
statute." Id § 423452(c).
152. See 745 ILL. COmP. STAT. ANN. 46/10 (West Supp. 1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 23:291 (West Supp. 1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 598 (West Supp. 1996).
153. Tit. 26, § 598.
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sure" language seems akin to "actual malice," the "with mali-
cious intent" portion seems more in keeping with the common
law definition of malice.
Indeed, a majority of the new statutes appear to retain the
common law form of malice. Under these statutes, a showing of
something akin to either actual malice or common law malice
rebuts the good faith presumption. A typical example is Alaska's
statute which states an employer may be liable if it "recklessly,
knowingly, or with a malicious purpose disclose[s] false or delib-
erately misleading information."" Delaware requires the in-
formation to be knowingly false, deliberately misleading, or
rendered with malicious purpose. 5 ' Under these statutes, the
plaintiff may be able to succeed upon a claim by proving the
defendant engaged in the less rigid common law form of malice.
These types of statutes, therefore, do not alter the common law
unless the statutory definition of malice differs from the common
law definition of that particular state.
Of those states that use a combination of actual and common
law malice, the majority retain the traditional preponderance of
the evidence standard.'56 Only a handful of states utilize the
stricter clear and convincing standard.'57 Again, unless the
commoi law of the state requires something greater than a
preponderance, the statutes do not alter the traditional burden
of proof.
154. ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.160(1) (Michie 1996).
155. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 708(a) (Supp. 1996). Interestingly, and perhaps
regrettably, at least two states, California and Georgia, make no mention at all of
falsity. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 47(c) (West Supp. 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1-4
(Supp. 1996).
156. States that employ the preponderance standard include Alaska, Colorado, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Wyoming. See ALASKA STAT. §
09.65.160 (Michie 1996); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-114(2)(a) (Supp. 1996); OHiO REV.
CODE ANN. § 4113.71 (B)(1) (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §
61(A) (West Supp. 1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.178 (Supp. 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
28-6.4-1(c) (Supp. 1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-105 (Supp. 1996); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 27-1-113(a) (Michie Supp. 1996).
157. States that employ the "clear and convincing" standard include Florida, South
Dakota, and Wisconsin. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.095 (West Supp. 1997); S.D. COD-
IFIED LAws § 60-4-12 (Michie Supp. 1996); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.487(2) (West
1997).
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Several commentators have suggested eliminating the com-
mon law malice standard in employer reference cases.15 Pro-
fessor Bradley Saxton, for example, has argued that because the
employment relationship sometimes ends acrimoniously, employ-
ees can claim easily that negative references were motivated by
malice.'59 Although "the majority view is that when a spiteful
or vengeful motive coexists with a legitimate... interest in pub-
lishing the defamatory communication, the privilege will be lost
only if the malicious motive predominates," the persistence of
the common law malice standard still causes potential prob-
lems. ' The question of whether an improper motive predomi-
nates would ultimately be a jury question. 6' If employees es-
tablish that references were motivated at least in part by feel-
ings of ill will, employers must invest substantial resources in
attempting to disprove that ill will was their main motivation.
Furthermore, how juries apply the somewhat vague concept of
malice in a particular case is often an issue. Although spite or ill
will are the usual synonyms for malice, other common terms
include evil intent, wanton conduct, wrongful motive, culpable
recklessness, and evil mindedness. 6 0. Lee Reed and Jan W.
Henkel state: "For a jury receiving such an amalgam of instruc-
tion, unreasonableness of conduct and ill will must merge into
some confusing quality of 'badness' about defendant's statements
concerning plaintiff." " It would not be unrealistic, for exam-
ple, for a sympathetic jury to conclude from just a hint of ill will
that an unsympathetic employer acted in such a way that he
deserves to suffer some negative consequences. Juries might po-
tentially "disregard ambiguous instructions and render
'community' judgment, deciding cases upon some ad hoc notion
of what is fair."'
158. See Daniloff, supra note 6, at 708-11; Lewis et al., supra note 6, at 861-62;
Reed & Henkel, supra note 6, at 318-21; Saxton, supra note 84, at 79-82.
159. See Saxton, supra note 84, at 79-82 (arguing that employers' decisions to pro-
vide negative references may be motivated both by a desire to protect the interests
of prospective employers and by feelings of ill will toward employees).
160. SI0LLA, supra note 7, § 8.09[3][b].
161. See generally Reed & Henkel, supra note 6, at 317 (discussing the role of
juries in defamation cases).
162. See id. at 314.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 319; see also O'Brien v. Papa Gino's of Am., 780 F.2d 1067 (1st Cir.
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Eliminating the common law forms of malice from the stat-
utes is advisable from a policy standpoint. First, it might en-
courage employers who, for whatever reason, do harbor ill will
toward their former employees to provide references. Currently,
employers in such situations may fear, with at least some justifi-
cation, that traces of malice on the employers' part may be suffi-
cient to land them in court at the mercy of unsympathetic juries.
By requiring a knowingly false disclosure or one made with
reckless disregard for the truth of the statement, employers will
not have to be as concerned that circumstances of terminations
may lead to inferences of malice sufficient to hold them liable.
Because the societal interest in employer references is so strong,
the benefits from eliminating the common law malice standard
outweigh the privacy concerns of employees.
Violation of Civil Rights
Another common characteristic of many statutes is another
abuse of the conditional privilege---disclosure in violation of
plaintiffs' civil rights or in violation of nondisclosure agreements.
Ten states specifically mention that disclosures in violation of
employees' civil rights can open employers to liability.'" In
three states, statutory immunity does not apply if information
was disclosed in violation of nondisclosure agreements or was oth-
erwise confidential.16 Nearly all these statutes state that these
1986) (affirming jury verdict holding an employer who fired employee for cocaine use
liable due to employer's personal grudge against employee).
165. These states are Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon,
Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.160(2) (Michie
1996); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-114(2)(a) (Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.095
(West Supp. 1997); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 46/10 (West Supp. 1997); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 50-12-1 (Michie Supp. 1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.71(B)(2) (Banks-
Baldwin Supp. 1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.178 (Supp. 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-
6.4-1(c)(4) (Supp. 1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-105(5) (Supp. 1996); WIS. STAT.
ANN § 895.487(2) (West 1997). In addition, the statute of Michigan states that a dis-
closure in violation of any state or federal statute is grounds for liability. See MICH.
CoMP. LAws ANN. § 423.452(2)(c) (West Supp. 1997).
166. Those states are Delaware, Georgia, and South Dakota. See DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 19, § 708 (a) (Supp. 1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1-4(b) (Supp. 1996); S.D. CODI-
PIED LAWS § 60-4-12(2) (Michie Supp. 1996).
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types of abuses must be proven by a preponderance standard.1 7
What Types of Information May Be Disclosed
Of the twenty-six statutes at issue, only three fail to include
job performance among the types of information that may be
released under the good faith presumption."c Twelve of the
statutes say that the statute covers only information concerning
job performance or information about the employee, but fail to
define the term "job performance."'69 Indeed, most statutes do
not provide any definition of the ambiguous term job
performance.' An exception to this pattern is Louisiana's
statute, which defines job performance as including, but not
limited to, "attendance, attitude, awards, demotions, duties,
effort, evaluations, knowledge, skills, promotions, and disciplin-
ary actions."'7 '
In several states, including Georgia, employee actions that
constitute a violation of law may be disclosed. 2 Some states,
167. These states include Alaska, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode
Island, and Tennessee. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.160 (Michie 1996); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 8-2-114 (2)(a) (Supp. 1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1-4 (b) (Supp. 1996); 745
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 46/10 (West Supp. 1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.71
(B)(1) (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.178 (Supp. 1996); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 28-6.4-1(c) (Supp. 1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-105 (Supp. 1996).
168. These states include Indiana, Kansas, and New Mexico. See IND. CODE ANN. §
22-5-3-1(b) (Michie 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-119a (Supp. 1996); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 50-12-1 (Michie Supp. 1996).
169. These states are Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and Wyoming. See ALASKA
STAT. § 09.65.160 (Michie 1996); COL. REV. STAT. § 8-2-114(2)(a) (Supp. 1996); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 768.095 (West Supp. 1997); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 46/10 (West
Supp. 1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-5-3-1 (Michie 1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
4113.71(B) (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 61(A) (West
Supp. 1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.178 (Supp. 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.4-1(c)
(Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-4-12 (Michie Supp. 1996); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 50-1-105 (Supp. 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-42-1(1) (Supp. 1996); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 27-1-113(a) (Michie Supp. 1996).
170. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 47(c) (West Supp. 1997).
171. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:291(C)(5) (West Supp. 1997). South Carolina simi-
larly defines job performance. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-65(A)(5) (Law Co-op. Supp.
1996).
172. See GA. CODE ANN. 34-1-4(b) (Supp. 1996) (stating that an employer may
disclose "any act committed by such employee which would constitute a violation of
the laws of this state if such act occurred in this state"); see also DEL. CODE ANN.
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Louisiana, for example, state that employers may disclose the
reason for employees' terminations.'7" Other types of informa-
tion that may be released by employers include evaluations of
the employees' ability to carry out their duties,'74 evaluations
of employees' professional conduct,'75 and employees' pay levels
and wage histories. 6
In evaluating what types of information should be included in
a statute, it is important to remember that the conditional privi-
lege applies only when the value of exchanging information
outweighs the individual's interest in his or her reputation.
77
At common law, inclusion of irrelevant information is sufficient
to constitute abuse of privilege.'78 The free exchange of infor-
mation that is irrelevant in determining the suitability of an em-
ployee for particular employment cannot be said to outweigh the
individual's interest. The statutes, therefore, should extend the
privilege only to information that relates to the employer's abil-
ity to make a reasonable assessment in the hiring process.
Fact-specific analysis determines, in large part, whether infor-
mation contained in a reference was not reasonably believed to
be necessary to accomplish the privileged purpose. Those stat-
utes that describe protected information in detail help eliminate
the potential for courts to interpret the amorphous job perfor-
tit. 19, § 708(b)(2) (Supp. 1996) (including in the definition of information that an
employer may disclose about a current or former employee's job performance "[alny
act committed by such employee which would constitute a violation of federal, state
or local law").
173. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:291(A) (West Supp. 1997) (stating that an em-
ployer who provides "reasons for separation" concerning a former employee to a pro-
spective employer "shall be immune from civil liability and other consequences of
such disclosure provided such employer is not acting in bad faith"); see also MD.
CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-399.7(a) (Supp. 1996) (discussing liability of an
employer for disclosing "the reason for termination of employment of an employee or
former employee of the employer").
174. See GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1-4(b) (Supp. 1996); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §
708(b)(3) (Supp. 1996).
175. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1361(C) (West Supp. 1996); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 34-42-1(1) (Supp. 1996).
176. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-119a(b) (Supp. 1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-65(B)
(Law Co-op. Supp. 1996).
177. See supra text accompanying note 27.
178. See supra text accompanying note 29.
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mance description in a manner inconsistent with what the legis-
lators had in mind.79 Arguably, the broad term job perfor-
mance might be advantageous for employers because it would
provide courts with greater flexibility to draw upon prior cases
to determine whether a particular disclosure falls outside of the
privilege.
A detailed definition, however, seems more desirable because
an exhaustive list of protected information probably would dis-
courage plaintiffs from bringing lawsuits in the first place. It
also would provide a greater measure of predictability than the
common law. As the Supreme Court said in a different context
in Upjohn Co. v. United States,8" "[an uncertain privilege...
is little better than no privilege at all."'' A specific definition
of job performance would discourage plaintiffs from arguing that
publications fall outside the scope of the definition and therefore
would reduce the likelihood of suits surviving summary judg-
ment. If legislatures do not expand the definition so far as to
cover information irrelevant to decision-making in the hiring
process, then a specific listing of what types of information are
afforded a conditional privilege is desirable."8 2
In addition, an exhaustive list of the types of information that
may be disclosed could better protect employees. A specific list-
ing would discourage employers who have included irrelevant
information, not listed in the statute, from arguing that the
disclosures were somehow related to employees' job performanc-
es. A specific listing, therefore, might prevent employers from
including information that is irrelevant to the decision-making
process, in other words, the interest that makes the information
privileged.
179. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 708(b) (Supp. 1996).
180. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
181. Id. at 393.
182. Louisiana's statute demonstrates this type of desirable statute. See LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 23:291 (West Supp. 1997). All of the information listed in the defini-
tion of job performance seems geared toward helping employers make hiring deci-
sions and none seems particularly intrusive upon employees' privacy interests, such
as religidus faith. See id. § 23:291(C)(5); see also supra text accompanying note 171.
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Requests
Another common characteristic of the statutes is the require-
ment that current or former employers must await requests be-
fore they can publish information concerning an employee. At
least twenty states require that in order to receive the good faith
presumption, employers must be responding to requests from
either prospective employers or former or current employees."
At least two statutes require that requests be in writing."'
Under the Restatement, an important factor in determining
whether a publication is privileged is the consideration of wheth-
183. These are Alaska, Arizona (only requests from prospective employers), Colora-
do, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois (only requests from prospective employers), Loui-
siana, Maryland, Michigan, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island,
South Carolina (only requests from prospective employers), South Dakota, Tennessee,
Utah (only requests from prospective employers), and Wisconsin. See ALASKA STAT. §
09.65.160 (Michie 1996); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1361(C) (West Supp. 1996);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-114(2)(a) (Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.095 (West
Supp. 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1-4(b) (Supp. 1996); IDAHO CODE § 44-201(2)
(Supp. 1996); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 46/10 (West Supp. 1997); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 23:291(A) (West Supp. 1997); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-
399.7(a)(1) (Supp. 1996); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.452 (West Supp. 1997); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 50-12-1 (Michie Supp. 1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.71(B)
(Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 61(A) (West Supp. 1997);
OR. REV. STAT. § 30.178 (Supp. 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS 28-6.4-1(c) (Supp. 1996); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 41-1-65(C) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 60-4-12
(Michie Supp. 1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-105 (Supp. 1996); UTAH CODE ANN.
34-42-1(1) (Supp. 1996); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.487(2) (West 1997). California's stat-
ute also arguably falls into this category. Its statute defines a privileged communica-
tion as one made, "without malice, to a person interested therein, (1) by one who is
also interested, or (2) by one who stands in such a relation to the person interested
as to afford a reasonable ground for supposing the motive for the communication to
be innocent, or (3) who is requested by the person interested to give the informa-
tion." CAL. CIV. CODE § 47(c) (West Supp. 1997). The statute specifically mentions
that this subdivision "applies to and includes a communication concerning the job
performance or qualifications of an applicant for employment... by a current or
former employer of the applicant to, and upon request of, the prospective employer."
Id. Kansas's statute is unusual in that current or former employers may disclose
certain types of information, such as dates of employment and pay levels, without
having to walt for requests, while in other areas, such as written employee evalua-
tions and the reasons for release from service, employers must wait for written re-
quests from prospective employers. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-119a(b), (c) (Supp.
1996).
184. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-65(C) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED
LAwS § 60-4-12 (Michie Supp. 1996).
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er the publication was made in response to a request rather
than simply volunteered by the publisher." Some employer
attorneys have argued that the statutory provisions extending
the good faith presumption only to cases in which employers are
responding to requests alter the common law because, under the
common law, employers need only business purposes for the giv-
ing of information.18 Even though employers generally are
presumed to have a conditional privilege due to the important
interest at stake, 8 7 the statutory requirement that employers
must wait for requests follows the Restatement's favoring of
responsive publication over voluntary publication."
This requirement is also desirable from a policy standpoint.
The primary function of references is to provide prospective em-
ployers with needed information. By requiring employers to wait
for requests for information, the statutes aid in preventing em-
ployers from maliciously attempting to ruin employees' chances
for employment elsewhere, or publishing information about em-
ployees to those who have no legitimate interests in the
employees' actions. Employees' privacy interests outweigh
employers' interests in publishing information to those who are
not considering employees for positions. Such action by employ-
ers might also violate a state's antiblacklisting statute if one
exists. 89
Four states require that employees be given access to any
written responses, either by requiring the referencing employer
to send copies of the responses or by giving employees access to
the responses."9 This requirement is more problematic from a
185. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 595(2)(a) (1977).
186. See New Ohio Statute Covers Liability for Employment References, OHIO EM-
PLOYMENT L. LETrER, May 1996, at 2, available in LEXIS, Employ Library, Emplaw
File.
187. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
188. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 595.
189. For a discussion of these types of statutes, see Saxton, supra note 84, at 54-
57.
190. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1361(B) (West Supp. 1996) (requiring that
copies of any written communication regarding employment be sent to employees);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-114(2)(b) (Supp. 1996) (requiring copies of the information
provided be sent to employees and allowing employees to obtain copies of references
by appearing at employers' places of business); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-5-3-1(c) (Michie
1997) (requiring the prospective employers to provide copies of any written communi-
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policy standpoint. It may, in some cases, strengthen employees'
privacy interests and provide an added incentive for employers
to provide truthful information. If employers know employees
can find out exactly what is being said about them, employers
will be less inclined to include false information. It also enables
employees to explain or deny the facts contained in references
and thereby potentially salvage their employment prospects.
The requirement may also have a negative effect. It creates an
additional burden, albeit slight, on employers and could poten-
tially create new litigation when employers, through oversight,
fail to comply with the requirement. Furthermore, it may
prompt already skittish employers to be less than candid in
their evaluations. A sensible solution would be to require, as
Indiana does, employers to provide copies of responses only if
the employees request them. 9' This approach would have the
advantages of providing a deterrent for employers to provide
false information while still limiting their compliance burden.
Miscellaneous Provisions
Absolute Immunity
One notable exception to the general trend of recognizing a
qualified privilege is Kansas's statute.9 2 While granting em-
ployers a qualified privilege when they provide certain informa-
tion to prospective employers,' Kansas takes the unusual step
of granting employers an absolute privilege when they provide
information about employees': (1) dates of employment; (2) pay
levels; (3) job descriptions and duties; and (4) wage histories."9
In the case of written responses to prospective employers' re-
cations that may affect employees' possibilities of employment upon written request
of employees); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-119a(c) (Supp. 1996) (requiring employers to
provide upon request from employees copies of any written evaluations provided to
prospective employers); see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.4-1(a) (Supp. 1996) (allowing
employees to inspect their personnel files, but specifically exempting references).
191. See § 22-5-3-1(c).
192. See § 44-119a.
193. See id. § 44-119a(a).
194. See id. § 44-119a(b).
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quests, employers have absolute immunity if they provide written
evaluations conducted prior to terminations and information
about whether employees were voluntarily or involuntarily re-
leased from services and the reasons for such separations.'95
Kansas's statute provides a good illustration of the dangers in-
herent in granting employers too much protection. Undeniably,
the statute goes a long way toward calming employers' concerns
over lawsuits. Under this statute, however, employers with neg-
ative feelings toward their former employees have little incentive
to provide unbiased or even truthful references. 9 ' Because em-
ployment relationships often end acrimoniously and both parties
may still harbor hostility, the statute fails to provide safeguards
for employees who are potentially at the mercy of their former
employers.
Attorney Fee Shifting
Both Arizona and Ohio have attorney fee shifting provisions
in their respective statutes.'97 Arizona's statute states that a
court "shall award court costs, attorney fees and other related
expenses to any party that prevails in any civil proceeding in
which a violation of this section is alleged."' Ohio's statute
provides that if the verdict is in favor of the defendant, the court
shall decide if the lawsuit was frivolous and may award reason-
able attorney fees.'99
Arguably, this type of provision could do more to calm
employers' fears than any other measure. Because one of the
greatest concerns to employers is the possibility of incurring
substantial attorney fees simply by having to defend against
suits, an attorney fee shifting provision would greatly ease
employers' concerns over the cost of having to defend such suits.
This provision would sever one of the root causes of employers'
reluctance to provide references. It is, therefore, surprising that
195. See id. § 44-119a(c).
196. See Ross, supra note 66, at 2 (describing the concerns of opponents of the
measure).
197. See ARIZ. REV. STAT.'ANN. § 23-1361(I) (West Supp. 1996); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 4113.71(C) (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1997).
198. § 23-1361(I) (emphasis added).
199. See § 4113.71(C).
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so few legislatures have implemented such a provision. The
decision can perhaps be explained by the longstanding reluc-
tance to alter the "American Rule," whereby each party pays its
own legal fees regardless of the outcome of the case.2"0 The
omission might also be explained as a decision by legislatures
not to unduly restrict employees' ability to take legal action
when they feel it appropriate.
Bradley Saxton has suggested a compromise approach. 0 ' In
his model statute, Saxton proposed that the awarding of attor-
ney fees should focus on the truthfulness of the reference. 20 2 If
the employer prevails at trial and the jury finds that a reference
was substantially true, the employer should be awarded attor-
ney fees.0 ' If the employer loses and the jury finds that the
reference was knowingly false and that the employer abused the
qualified privilege, then the employee should be awarded attor-
ney fees.2° An employer could not recover attorney fees if he
prevailed only by virtue of the qualified privilege.2 5 This solu-
tion seems sensible. This rule would simultaneously discourage
frivolous suits and allow parties to litigate genuine disputes.
Explicit Protection Against Negligent Hiring Claims
Louisiana appears to be the only state that provides explicit
protection for prospective employers from negligent hiring
suits. 26 The statute reads in part:
Any prospective employer who reasonably relies on informa-
tion pertaining to an employee's job performance or reasons
for separation, disclosed by a former employer, shall be im-
mune from civil liability including liability for negligent
hiring [and] negligent retention ... based upon such rea-
200. For a discussion of the historical development of the "American Rule," see
John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person's
Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1575-78 (1993).
201. See Saxton, supra note 84, at 100-01.
202. See id. at 100.
203. See id.
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:291(B) (West Supp. 1997).
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sonable reliance, unless further investigation, including but
not limited to a criminal background check, is required by
law!'
Granting this immunity is a prudent step. The statute seeks
to minimize transaction costs by encouraging former employers
to provide references and prospective employers to seek them.
Furthermore, the provision does not limit completely an injured
third party's ability to bring suit. Prospective employers' reliance
upon references must still be reasonable and the statute may, in
some instances, require further investigation.2 08 Through its
grant of immunity, the statute also addresses the issue of
workplace violence and seeks to ensure a safer, more efficient
workplace. Louisiana's statute implicitly recognizes that the ex-
change of references is a two part process-the providing of in-
formation and the receipt thereof. In the future, when legisla-
tures address the employer reference problem, they should ad-
dress both sides of the problem.
Employee Approval of the Release of References
Oklahoma takes the unusual step of requiring the
employee's consent before information about his job perfor-
mance can be disclosed to a prospective employer.20 9 It is cer-
tainly advisable from a liability standpoint for employers to
demand release forms authorizing the disclosure of information
upon request, but it is somewhat problematic to require this
action by statute.210 The requirement creates an additional
burden of compliance on employers that the benefits of such a
requirement do not outweigh. Presumably, the benefits of re-
quiring employee consent are the increased privacy protection
for employees and the reduction in the likelihood that employ-
ees will be able to allege subsequently that publications were
207. Id.
208. See id. The law, however, may be interpreted to require a greater obligation
on the part of prospective employers to check references because they now have
been granted immunity. See Landry & Hoffman, supra note 2, at 460.
209. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 61(A) (West Supp. 1997).
210. The Restatements position is that "the consent of another to the publication of
defamatory matter concerning him is a complete defense to his action for defama-
tion." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 583 (1977).
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motivated by malice. Undoubtedly, this argument has merit.
The problem with requiring employee consent arises in its
practical application. Although employers should be encouraged
to obtain such consent prior to the termination of the em-
ployment relationship, in some instances the employer will sim-
ply fail to do so. In order to comply with this statutory require-
ment, employers then will be forced to track down employees to
gain their consent. If employment relationships have ended less
than amicably, employees might justifiably be wary of giving
consent. Employers, therefore, would legally be unable to comply
with requests for information and prospective employers would
be left without potentially relevant information. If the ultimate
goal of the statute is to provide employers with the information
needed to make informed hiring decisions, this requirement ac-
tually may hinder the exchange of references and, therefore, is
not desirable.
Imposing A Duty To Warn
In order to reconcile the tension between employers' concerns
over defamation and negligent hiring doctrines, some commenta-
tors have argued that there should be an affirmative duty to
warn prospective employers of potentially dangerous employ-
ees.2 ' Janet Swerdlow, for example, has argued that a current
or former employer, when contacted for a reference, should "have
a duty to inform [a prospective employer] of any information it
has about the employee that could foreseeably present a risk of
danger to [the prospective employer] or anyone the employee
could foreseeably harm as a result of the employment."" None
of the newly enacted statutes impose such a duty.21 These
types of proposals have merit; however, because of their open-
ended nature, they ultimately may create more problems than
211. See Swerdlow, supra note 45, at 1657-67.
212. Id. at 1671. Saxton's solution is more limited: "[A]n employer must disclose in-
formation, if any, that may be reasonably necessary to warn the inquiring prospec-
tive new employer of the current or former employee's propensity to engage in vio-
lent or dangerous conduct posing a threat of physical injury to others." Saxton, su-
pra note 84, at 109.
213. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-114 (Supp. 1996).
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they solve. Instead of imposing a blanket duty to disclose, legisla-
tures should impose a duty to warn in specific occupations in
which there is a high risk of danger or in which the consequences
of dangerous employees are likely to be severe. 14
The theory behind imposing a duty to warn stems from the
seminal California Supreme Court decision in Tarasoff v. Re-
gents of the University of California.1 5 In Tarasoff, a patient
told his school psychotherapist that he intended to kill an un-
named girl, readily identifiable as Tatiana Tarasoff.29 When
the patient made good on his threat, Tarasoffs parents alleged
that the psychotherapist and his superior had failed to carry out
their duty to warn the victim of the patient's intentions.2 7 Af-
ter stating that generally no duty to warn exists, the court held
that such a duty does arise when: (1) a special relationship ex-
ists between one who has knowledge of the dangerous person's
intent to do harm and either the dangerous person or the poten-
tial victim; (2) the risk of harm is foreseeable; and (3) the poten-
tial victim is identifiable.18 Swerdlow argued that the three
elements of the Tarasoff test are satisfied by the employ-
er/employee relationship and that the Tarasoff holding, there-
fore, should be extended to the relationship.2
Admittedly, imposing such a duty would have benefits. If
employers were required to disclose the dangerous propensities
of their employees, incidents of workplace violence might be
reduced. Potential employers would be on notice of employees
who pose a threat of physical violence such as the worker in
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Jerner220 who was fired for bringing a
gun into his former workplace. Furthermore, because the law
would require employers to warn, this requirement would essen-
tially mute potential claims concerning the malicious intent of
the disclosure.
214. See infra text accompanying notes 240-51.
215. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
216. See id. at 341.
217. See id. at 339-40.
218. See id. at 342-43.
219. See Swerdlow, supra note 45, at 1660-67.
220. 650 So.2d 997 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); see supra text accompanying notes
64-69.
1997] 213
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
The notion that all employers should have a duty to warn
about potentially dangerous employees, however, should be re-
jected by state legislatures for several reasons. The special rela-
tionship requirement of Tarasoff seems somewhat attenuated in
the case of the employer/employee relationship. The Tarasoff
court concluded that the relationship between a patient and a
psychotherapist was sufficiently special to impose a duty to
warn. 2 ' As Swerdlow noted, the courts have expanded the
concept of special relationships to include relationships of depen-
dence.222 Because in most jurisdictions prospective employers
have a duty to exercise reasonable care in selecting employees
and because prospective employers must often rely on former
employers for the information they need to exercise such care,
Swerdlow argued that a dependent relationship exists between
former and prospective employers.2 She claimed that the
relationship between former employers and employees consti-
tutes a special relationship so as to justify the imposition of a
duty to warn.2"
But Swerdlow herself recognized factual distinctions exist
between the cases she cited to demonstrate a special relationship
and the case of former and prospective employers.' Swerdlow
cited Mann v. State226 to justify this type of special relation-
ship.22' In Mann, a police officer stopped to aid motorists whose
cars were stranded in the speed-change lane of the San
Bernandino Freeway. 28 When a tow truck arrived, the officer,
221. See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 343-44.
222. See Swerdlow, supra note 45, at 1660 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS) § 314A cmt. b (1967)). Among the examples Swerdlow cited as constituting a
special relationship include the relationship between bank and depositor, passenger
and carrier, parent and child, doctor and patient, and employer and employee. See
id.
223. See id. at 1660-61.
224. See id. at 1661.
225. See id. ("Although there are differences in the factual situations ... the char-
acteristics of the relationships themselves are similar to those in the relationship
between [current and prospective employers].").
226. 139 Cal. Rptr. 82 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).
227. See Swerdlow, supra note 45, at 1660.
228. See Mann, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 84.
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without advising those present, left the scene.' After his de-
parture, a passing car struck one of the cars and several of the
stranded motorists." ° The court in Mann held that a special
relationship between the officer and the motorists existed once
the officer stopped to render assistance.Y Swerdlow viewed the
relationship between former employers and prospective employ-
ers as being analogous to that of the police officer and the motor-
ists. 2 As Swerdlow noted, however: "In Mann, the special rela-
tionship between the police officer and the motorists did not arise
until the officer stopped to aid them." s By analogy, unless for-
mer employers have voluntarily agreed to provide information, a
special relationship does not exist. Courts addressing the employ-
ment context have reached similar conclusions.'M
Likewise, the relationship between former employers and
former employees does not seem sufficiently "special" to justify
the imposition of a duty. The Restatement classifies the relation-
ship of master and servant as a special relationsliip, 5 but it is
silent on the issue of an ongoing relationship after employers
and employees have parted ways."
Even if the imposition of a blanket duty to warn could be
justified under the law, it should be rejected for policy rea-
sons. 7 Unlike the therapist in Tarasoff, the average employer
generally lacks the ability to adequately assess an employee's
229. See id.
230. See id.
231. See id. at 86.
232. See Swerdlow, supra note 45, at 1660.
233. Id. at 1661.
234. See Moore v. St. Joseph Nursing Home, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 100, 103 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1990) (refusing to recognize a special relationship between a former employer
and a prospective employer sufficient to impose a duty to warn); Cohen v. Wales,
518 N.Y.S.2d 633, 634 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (holding that "[t]he mere recommenda-
tion of a person for potential employment is not a proper basis for asserting a claim
of negligence where another party is responsible for the actual hiring") (citations
omitted).
235. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 315, 317 cmts. b & c (1965).
236. But cf, Bodewig v. K-Mart, 635 P.2d 657, 661 (Or. Ct. App. 1981) (holding
that such a special relationship does exist).
237. This Note does not expressly reject the notion that such a duty could be justi-
fied. Swerdlow made a plausible argument for such a duty. See Swerdlow, supra
note 45, at 1660-71. Instead, this Note argues that the imposition of a duty to warn
in all cases would not be justified by the underlying policy concerns.
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dangerous propensities. Therapists are trained to assess
patients' behavior. Given the realities of the workplace, most
employers lack the insight into the inner workings of employees'
minds that would be required to make determinations as to
their potential for dangerous behavior. Unless an employee has
confided in the employer or has blatantly displayed a potential
for violent conduct, an employer could not state with any cer-
tainty that an employee does or does not pose a threat.
The imposition of such a duty also might be impractical. Con-
structing a workable definition of when employers have obliga-
tions to disclose information would be difficult. Should employ-
ers have to warn prospective employers if employees have short
tempers? If employees have gotten into shoving matches with co-
workers? If employers have good faith beliefs that employees are
dangerous? Under a blanket duty, some employers' actions could
fall under the category of officious intermeddling. The imposition
of a duty upon employers might have the perverse effect of actu-
ally encouraging more defamation suits from employees who
employers branded as "dangerous." If employers believe they are
potentially liable for not disclosing information, they may dis-
close trivial or minor incidents that have little bearing on
whether employees truly pose threats. Such disclosures could
adversely affect employment potential for good employees.
Admittedly, the imposition of such a duty would, in cases such
as Allstate Insurance Co. v. Jerner,"' in which an employee
brought a gun to work, probably reduce the likelihood of
workplace violence and injury. These types of cases, however,
appear to be a distinct minority and the common law provisions
seem sufficient to address them. 9 The additional burdens on
employers resulting from the imposition of a duty to warn do not
seem to outweigh the minimal benefits realized from such a re-
quirement. Employers would be forced to be constantly on the
lookout for tell-tale signs of potential danger. Employers would
238. 650 So. 2d 997 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); see supra text accompanying notes
64-67.
239. See Larson, supra note 96, at Al, A10 (citing a 1994 Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics report that found co-workers and ex-employees were responsible for only 59 of
1063 workplace homicides in 1993).
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have to keep even more detailed records of workplace incidents
for fear of forgetting the one "smoking gun" that could land
them in court.
A Narrow Application of Tarasoff
In Tarasoff, the court concluded that although the therapist's
conversations with a patient are privileged, "[t]he protective
privilege ends where the public peril begins."' ° In keeping
with this notion, a better solution would be to impose a duty to
warn only in situations in which a high risk of danger exists or
in which the consequences of dangerous employees are likely to
be severe. Following Tarasoff in such cases, the potential bur-
dens on employers and the reduction in employee privacy rights
are outweighed by the potential for harm. When a significant
threat of harm exists or the harm is likely to be great, the public
policy of promoting safety should prevail."'
Ultimately, legislatures would have to make a policy choice as
to which occupations they believe warrant the imposition of a
duty to warn. A recently proposed, 'but not enacted, federal avia-
tion safety bill might provide a workable example for state legis-
latures. In 1996, Congressmen John Duncan and Fred Heineman
introduced the Airline Pilot Hiring and Safety Act of 1996,2
which would have required an air carrier to request past perfor-
mance records of pilots seeking new flying jobs."a The legis-
lation would have required both the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration (FAA) and any air carrier that had employed the pilot
during the preceding five years to furnish information concerning
the applicant.' The lawmakers proposed the bill in response to
240. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 347 (Cal. 1976).
241. See infra text accompanying notes 249-51.
242. H.R. 3536, 104th Cong. (1996). The bill proposed to amend 49 U.S.C. § 44,723
by redesignating § 44,723 as § 44,724 and designating the new bill as § 44,723. See
id. § 2(a).
243. See id. § 2(a)(1).
244. See id. The records to which the Act would apply include summaries of legal
enforcement actions; records pertaining to the "training, qualifications, proficiency, or
professional competence of the individual;" records concerning any disciplinary action
relating to the individual; and records concerning the "release from employment or
resignation, termination, or disqualification with respect to employment." Id. §
2(a)(1)(A), (B).
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the November 1994 crash of American Eagle Flight 3379 that
killed fifteen people. 5 The National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) charged that such a policy could have prevented
the crash had it been in place when American Eagle hired the
pilot of the flight."4' American Eagle failed to ask the pilot's for-
mer employer, Comair, about the pilot's record because it did not
believe that Comair would have divulged any information beyond
dates of employment and the kind of equipment the pilot
flew.' Had Comair provided full records on the pilot, American
Eagle would have learned that the pilot was on the verge of dis-
missal from Comair for his unsatisfactory performance and for
fear "that in an emergency he might freeze up.""5
The healthcare industry is a logical choice on which to impose
a duty to exchange references. West Virginia, for example, re-
quires residential day care facilities, day care centers, and home
care service providers to respond to all requests by other service
providers for references for former or present employees. 9 The
same rationale might also be applied to any occupation involving
substantial interaction with minors." There is a logical analo-
gy between these types of occupations and the airline industry.
In the airline industry, the risk from a dangerous pilot is high.
In the service provider industry, the consequences of a dangerous
employee are great. The public peril in both situations justifies
the additional burden upon employers and the potential privacy
245. See Eric Dyer, RDU Crash Spurs Pilot Histories Legislation; Measure Protects
Airlines From Suits, Gives Basis for Hiring, HERALD-SUN, July 24, 1996, at C1.
246. See Aviation Safety: Should Airlines Be Required to Share Pilot Performance
Records?: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Committee on Transporta-
tion and Infrastructure, 104th Cong. 72-75 (1995) [hereinafter Congressional Hearing]
(statement of Jim Hall, Chairman, NTSB).
247. See Matthew L. Wald, Safety Board Urges Government to Monitor Pilots' Job
Records, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1995, at A3.
248. Congressional Hearing, supra note 246, at 75 (statement of Jim Hall,
Chairman NTSB); see also Wald, supra note 247.
249. See W. VA. CODE § 15-2C-8(3) (Supp. 1996).
250. Some states already require criminal background and fingerprint checks of
school employees. See, e.g., Wyoming Legislature Passes Employment Laws Favorable
to Employers, Wyo. EMPLOYMENT L. LETTER, May 1996, at 3, available in LEXIS,
Employ Library, Emplaw File (discussing the recently enacted Wyoming law requir-
ing school boards to make such checks).
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concerns of employees."m ' Legislatures should therefore require
the free exchange of information in these types of situations.
Proposed Model Statute
The following model statute borrows from existing statutes and
incorporates the analysis undertaken in the previous sections.
SEC. X EMPLOYMENT REFERENCE IMMUNITy
A. As used in this section:
(1) "Employee" means any person, paid or unpaid, in
the service of an employer."
(2) "Employer" means any person, firm, or corporation
who employs an individual for compensation or who
supervises an individual providing labor as a volun-
teer."
(3) "Prospective employer" means any "employer," as
defined herein, to whom an employee or former em-
ployee has submitted an application, either oral or
written, or forwarded a resume or other correspon-
dence expressing an interest in employment.2"
(4) "Prospective employee" means any individual who
has taken such actions as defined in subsection (3).
(5) "Information pertaining to job performance" in-
cludes, but is not limited to attendance, attitude,
awards, dates of service, demotions, duties, evalua-
tions, knowledge, level of pay, promotions, skills, and
disciplinary action.s
B. Any current or former employer that responds to a re-
quest from an employee or a prospective employer of that
251. Admittedly, serious privacy concerns are involved in any such action. If a
teacher, for example, was accused falsely of misconduct with a student and was
forced to resign from his or her position, this accusation could be disclosed with im-
punity by the teacher's former employer so long as the disclosure was not made
with actual malice. Potentially, teachers, health care providers, or pilots could suffer
grave and undeserved consequences in their future job searches.
252. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:291(C)(2) (West Supp. 1997).
253. See MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.451(b) (West Supp. 1997).
254. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:291(C)(3) (West Supp. 1997).
255. See id. § 23:291(C)(5).
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employee for information pertaining to job performance is
presumed to be acting in good faith and is qualifiedly im-
mune from liability in a civil action by the employee or any
other person for any harm sustained as a proximate cause
of the disclosure. This immunity shall not apply to informa-
tion not requested by an employee or prospective employer
of that employee. This immunity shall not apply if:
(1) it is shown by a preponderance of the evidence that
the information provided was not limited to the scope
of inquiry by the employee or prospective employer of
that employee or was not reasonably necessary to
achieve the purposes for which the information was re-
quested; or
(2) it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that
the disclosure was knowingly false or deliberately mis-
leading, or made with reckless disregard as to the
information's truth or falsity; or
(3) it is shown by a preponderance of the evidence that
the disclosure was in violation of an employee's civil
rights or in violation of any applicable state or federal
law.
C. Any prospective employer who reasonably relies on infor-
mation pertaining to an employee's job performance or rea-
sons for separation, disclosed by a current or former employ-
er, shall be immune from civil liability for negligent hiring,
negligent retention, and other causes of action related to the
hiring of said employees, based upon such reasonable reli-
ance, unless further investigation, including but not limited
to a criminal background check, is required by law."
D. If, in a civil action based upon an employment reference,
the verdict is in favor of the defendant, the jury shall assess
whether the disclosure was substantially true. If the jury so
finds, the court shall award reasonable attorney fees and
court costs of the defendant. If the verdict is in favor of the
plaintiff, the court may award reasonable attorney fees and
256. See id. § 23:291(B).
220 [Vol. 39:177
EMPLOYEE REFERENCE LAWS
court costs of the plaintiff.1 7
E. Upon written request by the prospective employee, the
prospective employer will provide copies to the employee of
any written communications from current or former employ-
ers concerning the employee. The request must be received
by the prospective employer not later than thirty days after
the application is made to the prospective employer. 5
F. A current or former employer, in one of the occupations
listed below, shall provide information concerning an
employee's job performance upon the request of a prospec-
tive employer. Such information must be disclosed only if
the prospective employer is also engaged in one of the occu-
pations listed below:
(1) residential day care facilities, day care centers, and
home care service providers authorized to operate in
the state; 9
(2) school personnel or those who, in the course of their
duties have regular contact with minors.
G. With the exception of subsection F, this section does not
create any new cause of action.
Analysis
The existing statutes may provide some psychological com-
fort to employers as they wrestle with whether they should
provide references. At least now employers have a more defini-
tive standard to which they may look when making decisions.
Instead of consulting legal counsel to interpret the vagaries of
common law, employers may now simply read the law.
Upon close examination, however, the statutes may not be
successful in encouraging employers to provide references. The
majority of statutes grant employers little that they did not
257. Cf Saxton, supra note 84, at 100, 110-11.
258. See IND. CODE ANN. § 22-5-3-1(c) (Michie 1997).
259. Cf. W. VA. CODE § 15-2C-8(3) (Supp. 1996) (requiring all residential care facil-
ities, day care centers, and home care service providers to "[r]espond promptly to all
requests by other service providers for references for former or present employees of
the agency, which response may include a subjective assessment as to whether the
individual for whom the reference is sought is suited to provide services to children
or incapacitated adults").
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already have at common law.26 Employers previously were
entitled to a conditional privilege when they provided referenc-
es and the new statutes add little to this protection.26' By
retaining the common law form of malice, many of the stat-
utes fail to protect employers from questionable verdicts ren-
dered by juries confused over the vague concept of ill will.
Statutes that fail to define liability fully may risk leaving the
ultimate interpretation of the statutes to judges who may rely
simply on the muddled common law abuse of privilege stan-
dard. Practitioners who represent employers will almost cer-
tainly notice these shortcomings and will most likely advise
their clients accordingly. So far, reaction from employer attor-
neys has been mixed.262
Perhaps the single greatest cause of the current employer
reference gridlock is employers' fear of lawsuits.Y Defending
lawsuits takes time and money. Even if employers ultimately
260. Indeed, some practitioners have argued that individual statutes in some ways
actually afford employers less protection than at common law. See New Ohio Statute
Covers Liability for Employment References, supra note 186, at 2-3 (arguing that the
Ohio statute may weaken the common law through its requirement that employers
receive requests before providing information through its use of the malice standard
and other provisions); cf Landry & Hoffman, supra note 2, at 458-61 (discussing
limitations of the Louisiana statute).
261. See supra text accompanying note 27.
262. See Briefs, WIS. EMPLOYMENT L. LETER, Aug. 1996, at 8, available in LEXIS,
Employ Library, Emplaw File ("[Tihis law should eabe employers' fears of being sued
for providing truthful information about former employees. . . ."); New Delaware
Law Provides Immunity for Employer References, DEL. EMPLOYMENT L. LETTER, Aug.
1996, at 1, available in LEXIS, Employ Library, Emplaw File ("Since Delaware had
already provided in judicial decisions the same protection that the statute affords,
cautious employers might wonder whether they should alter [their current] prac-
tice."); New Indiana Law Simplifies Employe6 Reference Dilemma, IND. EMPLOYMENT
L. LETTER, July 1995, at 2, available in LEXIS, Employ Library, Emplaw File
("[E]ven the amendments limited protection will likely help employers sleep easier
and avoid lawsuits."); New Ohio Statute Covers Liability for Employment References,
supra note 186, at 2-3 (discussing ways in which Ohio's statute may weaken existing
common law protections); Wyoming Legislature Passes Employment Laws Favorable to
Employers, supra note 250, at 3 ("lit is still not advisable to disclose performance
information to prospective employers without a written authorization to release such
information signed by the former employee.").
263. See generally Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 6, at 138-43; Reed & Henkel,
supra note 6, at 317-18.
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win, they will have invested considerable resources in their
defense-resources that smaller companies often cannot af-
ford.' "
While prospective employers have much to gain from the free
exchange of references, current or former employers have little
incentive to provide them. Some employers may wish to provide
a reference about a former employee, arguing that "Jane Smith
was a dedicated employee of this company for fifteen years. She
deserves a good reference." Others, particularly those in smaller
communities, may hope that by providing references, other em-
ployers will be encouraged to do the same when the appropriate
time comes. These inclinations should be encouraged.
So long as the perception exists among employers that they
run the risk of losing a lawsuit every time they provide refer-
ences, employers will likely not stick out their collective necks.
Though it is too soon to judge how effective the new laws will be
in breaking the reference gridlock, it appears doubtful that they
will succeed. Indeed, it is questionable how successful even the
best-designed statute, standing alone, might be in bringing
about the desired affect.
Consider the case of Sigal Construction Corp. v. Stanbury, 6 5
a run-of-the-mill defamation case based on an employer refer-
ence. Sigal Construction Corp. ("Sigal") fired Kenneth Stanbury,
one of its project managers, because he was "not doing his job
correctly."266 After Stanbury applied for a job with a new com-
pany, his prospective employer contacted the defendant in order
to obtain a reference.267 Paul Littman, Sigal's project executive,
told Stanbury's prospective employer that Stanbury "seemed
detail oriented to the point of losing sight of the big picture" and
"[olbviously [Stanbury] no longer worked for us and that might
say enough."2" Littman in fact had never worked with
Stanbury nor had he even read an evaluation of Stanbury's work
performance.169 Littman could recall no facts or work related
264. See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
265. 586 A.2d 1204 (D.C. 1991).
266. Id. at 1206.
267. See id.
268. Id.
269. See id.
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incidents to support his conclusion and based it primarily on a
"'general impression [he] had developed' from 'hearing people
talk about [Stanbury's] work at the job."'27
At trial, the jury returned a verdict for Stanbury on his defa-
mation count.27' On appeal, Sigal argued that the statements
were mere opinions and, as such, could not be defamatory.2
The court disagreed and held that Littman should have known
that Stanbury's prospective employer would interpret the
statements as factual evaluations of Stanbury's work.273
A similar outcome probably would occur under an employer-immunity statute as well. Both parties agreed that a conditional
privilege attached to the defendant's statements.274 A typical
statute's grant of a good faith presumption or conditional privi-
lege, therefore, would not have altered the disposition of the
case. The Stanbury court applied Virginia law, whereby the
plaintiff can overcome the conditional privilege through a show-
ing of clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted
with common law malice, or in other terms, bad faith.275 The
jury's finding that the defendant abused the privilege would
have remained unchanged whether the statute required the
more typical preponderance standard or the stricter clear and
convincink standard of proving common law malice.276 More-
over, because the court upheld the jury's conclusion that, by
relying on mere office gossip, the defendant had acted with gross
indifference or recklessness, 77 a similar outcome would have
occurred, even under a statute requiring a showing of actual
malice.
270. Id.
271. See id. at 1208. The jury awarded Stanbury $370,440 in damages. See id. The
trial court subsequently reduced the damages award to $250,000. See id.
272. See id. Sigal did not contest, on appeal, that the statements were false or
negligently made. See id. at 1213.
273. See id. at 1211-13.
274. See id. at 1213.
275. See id. at 1214.
276. The court noted that "[o]nly if there is no evidence to support a finding of
common law malice will a court be justified in withholding the issue from the jury."
Id.
277. See id. at 1215.
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The Stanbury decision illustrates several important points.
First, it demonstrates how little protection even employer-friend-
ly statutes might provide employers who act foolishly.2 78 Sec-
ond, the case helps to illustrate how closely the newly-enacted
statutes parallel the common law as they apply to employer
references. Finally, Stanbury reveals how little new protection
the statutes provide. Even if the court mechanically applied one
of the typical statutes, an identical outcome probably would have
resulted. This analysis thus suggests that, although the statutes
offer some psychological benefit to employers, the substance of
the law remains largely unchanged.
EDUCATION OF EMPLOYERS: ADDRESSING THE ROOT CAUSE OF
THE PROBLEM
Because of the important interests at stake for both employers
and employees, state legislatures face a difficult task in drafting
even-handed statutes that effectively resolve the current dilem-
ma. To encourage the flow of references, groups representing
employers should move beyond reliance upon statutory grants of
immunity. The statutes, although a step in the right direction,
do not fully address what appears to be the root cause of the
current reference standstill-employers' fear over being sued. In
order to overcome this fear, employer groups should institute a
campaign designed to correct employers' apparent misconception
that providing references to prospective employers is likely to
278. A 1984 decision from a Texas appellate court provides a good illustration. In
Frank B. Hall & Co. v. Buck, 678 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. App. 1984), Larry Buck sued
his former employer for damages for defamation. After being fired by Frank B. Hall
& Co., Buck was unable to obtain other employment. See id. at 617. Buck hired an
investigator to discover the true reasons for his dismissal. See id. Posing as a pro-
spective employer, the investigator contacted several Hall employers and requested
information about Buck. See id. One employee described Buck as "untrustworthy,
and not always entirely truthful; ... disruptive, paranoid, hostile, and ... guilty of
padding his expense account." Id. Another employee said that "Buck was horrible in
a business sense, irrational, ruthless, and disliked by office personnel. He described
Buck as a 'classical sociopath,' who would verbally abuse and embarrass Hall em-
ployees." Id. Summing up, the employee described Buck as "ta zero,' 'a Jekyll and
Hyde person' who was 'lacking in compucture[sic] or scruples." Id. The jury awarded
Buck $1,905,000 in damages. See id. at 616. Given the extreme nature of the Hall
employees' comments, it is difficult to imagine any state passing an employer refer-
ence law which would shield an employer from liability for such comments.
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land them in court. Additionally, employer groups should in-
struct employers on how to avoid such suits in the first place.
Calming Employer Fears
Currently, disagreement exists as to the seriousness of the
threat of defamation suits that employers providing references
face. One authority states that "[tihe number of defamation ac-
tions filed by employees against employers has surged during
the past few years."279 Another claims "as many as five thou-
sand claims involving employment references are filed each
year."' 0 Employers' fears over being sued for providing refer-
ences is a constant theme in the articles reporting the recently
enacted employer immunity laws.28' A logical conclusion from
reading these accounts is that nearly every employer knows of
another employer who lost a lawsuit for providing an allegedly
false reference.
The empirical evidence suggests otherwise. A 1992 study of
employee defamation suits by Ramona L. Paetzold and Steven L.
Willborn concluded that from 1985 to 1989, employees were less
likely to win a defamation suit, were less likely to win an award
of damages, and in cases in which damages were awarded, were
likely to win a lesser amount than in the period from 1965 to
1969.282 Although trends may have changed after the conclu-
sion of this study, even some members of employer groups seem
to acknowledge that the number of defamation suits has not
substantially increased in recent years.'
Whatever the reality, employers apparently believe that defa-
mation lawsuits are a deterrent to providing references. Like the
story about Jimmy Hoffa being buried under the end zone at
279. GREEN & REIBSTEIN, supra note 21, at 63.
280. Ronald Turner, Compelled Self-Publication: How Discharge Begets Defamation,
14 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 19, 20 (1988).
281. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 66.
282. See Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 6, at 136-38.
283. See Forster, supra note 4 (quoting Michael Fields, the state director of South
Carolina's chapter of the National Federation of Independent Businesses as saying
"Ithe problem is not that there was a rash of lawsuits . . . [rather] [tihere were no
lawsuits because no one was talking").
226 [Vol. 39:177
EMPLOYEE REFERENCE LAWS
Giants Stadium, the belief is not unlike urban folklore.' The
stories have been repeated so often that they are now accepted
as being true. Until this belief is addressed adequately, the
problem is likely to continue.
Education can address the concerns of employers. Education
was, at least in part, an intended goal of the campaign to imple-
ment the various reference laws. A representative of the Society
for Human Resource Management predicted that as employers
learn more about the protection the new laws afford, their anxi-
eties will lessen."5 If, however, attorneys for employers regard
the new laws as merely a codification of what they perceive as
the already ineffective common law or the same broken car with
a new paint job, then the educational goal of the laws will be
thwarted.
This Note has argued that the newly enacted statutes, stand-
ing alone, are unlikely to substantially improve the current situ-
ation. In order to increase the exchange of references, employers
need to feel that they run only a slight risk of getting sued in
the first place. Attorney fee shifting provisions and increased
burdens of proof might be effective to an extent, but they cannot
guarantee employers that they have nothing to fear from provid-
ing references. Until the root causes of employer reluctance are
addressed, the reference problem is likely to continue.
Now that employer groups have taken the first step of push-
ing for statutory immunity, they need to take the complementa-
ry step of conducting research in the area of employment defa-
mation suits. If, as Paetzold and Willborn's study suggested, 86
employer concern is exaggerated, this fact should be publicized
to employers. Regardless of the outcome of such a study, employ-
er groups should coordinate an education program that will
teach employers how to avoid such suits. 7 Better information
284. For a discussion of urban folklore, see JAN HAROLD BRUNVAND, THE VANISH-
ING HITCHHIERh AMERICAN URBAN LEGENDS AND THEIR MEANNGS (1981).
285. See Forster, supra note 4 (citing a statement by Sharon Horrigan, state leg-
islative affairs manager, Society for Human Resource Management).
286. See supra note 6.
287. For a discussion of some of the steps employers can take to protect
themselves from liability, see Rodolfo A. Camacho, How to Avoid Negligent Hiring
Litigation, 14 WHTrTER L. REV. 787 (1993).
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will do more to increase the exchange of information than statu-
tory reform alone. Only after the root causes of reference grid-
lock are addressed will the statutory protections be effective.
CONCLUSION
References are a valuable resource for both employers and
employees. Both sides have a legitimate interest in ensuring
that employers are free to provide honest and complete infor-
mation. When references function effectively, they benefit not
only the parties involved, but society as a whole through safer
and more efficient workplaces.
New reference immunity laws are a commendable first step
toward addressing employer reluctance to provide references,
but standing alone, they fail to, and are in fact incapable of,
eliminating the problem. To fully address the problem, legis-
latures and employer groups must coordinate their efforts. For
their part, employer groups need to supplement the existing
statutes by undertaking a campaign to fully inform their mem-
bers about the actual risks of providing references and how
employers can reduce such risks. Only through a combination of
legislative action and grass roots effort will all interested parties
obtain the protection they deserve.
Alex B. Long
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